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Comment

Aliens in a Foreign Field: Examining
Whether States have the Authority to Pass
Legislation in the Field of Immigration Law

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that immigration regulation is primarily a
national issue. The federal government regulates when people can come
into the country, how long they can stay, and what they can do while
they are here.' The United States Supreme Court has continually
reaffirmed Congress's plenary power to create and regulate immigration
laws.' Any comprehensive immigration reform law must come from
Congress. The recent laws passed by Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama
cannot be classified as immigration reform laws. Instead, these are
immigration "related" laws. The question then becomes just how far can
the states go in passing laws that are related to immigration? Unfortunately for the state legislatures, there is no bright-line answer, but the
courts' adjudicative challenges to these state laws have started to
provide some clarity. So far it seems the states are allowed to focus
immigration statutes in areas where they have traditional police powers,
1. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972).
2. See id.
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such as employment relationships. However, lingering questions remain
as to whether states may enforce federal immigration law through their
police powers and what type of role the states have in shaping foreign
policy.
Ultimately, it seems that the states have a limited role in passing
immigration-related laws, especially ones that interfere with federal
immigration law. This Comment attempts both to explain why the
states are so limited in their ability to pass immigration-related laws
and to examine alternative options the states do have to participate in
combating illegal immigration. Part II discusses generally what role the
federal government plays in creating and enforcing immigration law.
Part II also discusses what role the states can play in enforcing
immigration policy. Part III addresses why it will be difficult for states
to overcome the preemption doctrine. Generally, the preemption doctrine
is used by the courts to analyze whether federal and state laws can
coexist. Because the United States Constitution establishes that laws
passed by Congress are the supreme law of the land, courts must strike
down a state law if it conflicts with federal law.4 Part III also examines
why state level immigration laws are inconsistent with both established
police powers and foreign policy jurisprudence. Part IV discusses what
types of immigration-related laws the states are legitimately able to
pass. In addition, Part IV analyzes current developments in the
relationship between the United States Department of Homeland
Security and state level police officers while encouraging more cooperation between the federal and state governments.
II.

THE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION POLICY

The federal government has plenary power over the regulation of
immigration, while the states have the ability to pass laws that merely
affect immigration.' But just how far the states can go in passing laws
that affect immigration is a recurring question, continually raised as
different states pass laws that regulate alien registration requirements,
the exclusion of aliens from entry to a state, and even aliens' eligibility
to work or receive local benefits in a particular state. The recent laws
passed by Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama all have a direct effect on
immigration law enforcement because these laws, among other things,
allow state officers to check a suspect's immigration status, thereby

3. See infra Part II.A.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part II.A-B.
6. See Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and FederalSupremacy, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 939, 942 (1995).
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informing the Department of Homeland Security of that suspect's
presence in the country.' In order to understand the courts' treatment
of these recent state laws, it is helpful to briefly examine both the
accepted roles of the federal government and the states in regulating
immigration.
The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Immigration Policy
The federal government alone has the plenary power to prescribe rules
determining which aliens may enter the country and which aliens may
stay. In Lung v. Freeman,' an 1875 case dealing with immigration
regulation, the Supreme Court expressly stated that Congress alone has
the authority to pass laws regulating the admission of immigrants into
the United States."o The Court held that a California law, which
allowed state officials to classify immigrants and fine them on the basis
of that classification, was unconstitutional because immigration
regulation affects international relations, and the national government
is responsible for defining American foreign policy." The Court also
expressed the fear that if a state passes an immigration law that harms
foreign relations so significantly that it starts a war with another nation,
then the United States, and not the individual state, would have to fight
that war." Sixty-five years later, in Hines v. Davidowitz," the Court
held that the national power of foreign affairs, including immigration,
naturalization and deportation, belongs to the federal government.'
There, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Alien Registration
In
Act 5 preempted Pennsylvania alien registration provisions. 6
reaching its decision, the Court stated that areas of law-like immigration-that affect foreign relations should be uniform and dealt with on a

A.

7. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, Reg. Sess. (2010), availableat http:H/www.azleg.gov/legtext/49
leg/2r/bills/sbl070s.pdf; Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (2011), available at http://wwwl.leg
is.ga.gov/legis/2011-12/falltext/hb87.htm; Ala. H.R. Bill 56, Reg. Sess. (2011), available at
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/axas/ACASLoginIE.asp?SESSION=1058.
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4.
9. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
10. Id. at 280 ("The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.").
11. Id. at 276, 279-80.
12. Id. at 279-80.
13. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
14. Id. at 62.
15. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 673 (repealed 1952).
16. Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
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national level and, when Congress regulates immigration, any state
action must be subordinate to the supreme national law.n
In the second half of the twentieth century, Congress passed many
different and important pieces of immigration legislation. Passed in
1952 and later amended in 1990, the Immigration and Nationality Act
9
(INA)" sets forth the systematic scheme of federal immigration law."
The INA defines alien classifications and sets forth the conditions
required for entry and residency in the United States according to each
classification. 20 Legal aliens must be classified either as a nonimmigrant, immigrant, and/or refugee, and each classification has separate
requirements that the alien must satisfy to stay in the country." Of
course, if an alien is in the country illegally, he is subject to removal.22
Removal proceedings are initiated and governed by the Department of
Homeland Security, and these proceedings require that the alien have
a hearing before an immigration judge."
Regarding employment, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA)" in 1986, which regulates employer compliance
requirements and penalties.2 IRCA makes it unlawful for an employer
to hire an illegal alien "or to hire anyone . .. without complying with the
work authorization verification system created by the [Act]."" The
verification system requires that an employer and employee complete
and sign a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
form 1-9, and that the employer examine and attest to the examination
of certain documents that verify a potential employee's identity and
authorization to work legally in the country. 7 IRCA also allows for
prosecution and sanctions against employers who do not comply with the
Act's requirements.2 8 IRCA also expressly preempts states from
imposing similar sanctions and penalties against employers."

17. Id. at 62-63, 68.
18. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
19. See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1294-96 (N.D. Ala. 2011)
(citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 196-98 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct.
2958 (2011)).
20. Id. at 1294.
21. Id. at 1294-95.
22. Id. at 1295.
23. Id.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
25. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1296-97.
26. Id. at 1296; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(aXl)-(2).
27. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1296; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
28. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1297; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(eXl)-(6).
29. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1297; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(hX2).
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In 1996, Congress added more verification requirements on employers
when it passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).ao One of the most important provisions in
IIRIRA established the E-Verify system, which allows an employer to
authenticate 1-9 documents provided by a potential employee. 3 1 The
employer enters the information from the documents into an online
system, and the federal government will respond and inform the
employer if the documents are authentic or fake.32 It is important to
note that federal law generally leaves the decision to use the E-Verify
system up to the individual employer." The employer instead can opt
to simply review the 1-9 documents without using E-Verify.4

B. The States' Role in the Field of Immigration Law
While the power to regulate immigration belongs to the federal
government, the states do have some authority to enact laws that might
affect immigration through their inherent police powers, provided that
the state laws are constitutional and not preempted by federal law.
For example, in De Canas v. Bica," the Supreme Court ruled that
while the power to regulate immigration is a federal power, the states
do have the power to regulate the employment relationships of immi-

30. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
31. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1298; see Basic Pilot Program Extension And
Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 2-3, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944. The United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services' website lists the purpose of 1-9 documents
as follows:
All U.S. employers must complete and retain a Form 1-9 for each individual they
hire for employment in the United States. This includes citizens and noncitizens.
On the form, the employer must examine the employment eligibility and identity
document(s) an employee presents to determine whether the document(s)
reasonably appear to be genuine and relate to the individual and record the
document information on the Form 1-9.
1-9, Employment EligibilityVerification, USCIS.Gov, http://www.uscis.gov/i-9 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2012).
32. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
33. Id. at 1299 ("Federal government employers and certain employers previously found
guilty of violating IRCA are currently required to use E Verify; all other employers remain
free to use the system of their choice.").
34. See id. One possible reason for the employer verifying the documents themselves
is that there could be a possibility of false reports, problems when a woman marries and
changes her name, or other extenuating circumstances.
35. See Manheim, supra note 6, at 971-73. In general, police power is a state's
authority "to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people."
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
36. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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Moreover, in John Doe No. 1 v. Georgia
grants in their state."
Department of Public Safety," the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia upheld a Georgia state law prohibiting
undocumented immigrants from obtaining drivers' licenses because it
"mirrorled] federal objectives and further[ed] a legitimate state goal." 9
But there are times when states go too far and try to regulate immigration in an impermissible way.o In the late 1800s, California had a
statute on the books that allowed the California Supreme Court to order
a group of Chinese women to be deported on the basis that they were
"lewd and debauched."" The Supreme Court struck down this law as
unconstitutional because, among other concerns, the law had negative
foreign policy implications." Also, as noted above, states cannot have
their own alien registration systems because that is completely regulated
by the federal government."
While states cannot implement their own immigration polices, there
are times when state actors may enforce federal immigration law
through the state's inherent police powers.4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized that state officers have
implicit authority to conduct investigations and make arrests for
violations of federal immigration law.45 The Tenth Circuit has also
held that state police officers can inquire into a person's immigration
status when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has
violated federal immigration law."6
In addition to the inherent state authority to enforce federal immigration law, Congress has enacted laws that expressly allow states to

37. Id. at 356. It is important to note that the particular type of employment
regulation in De Canas (punishing an employer by fines for hiring an illegal immigrant)
was declared preempted by the IRCA in Chamberof Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting. See 131
S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011). But it seems the general principle that the states have inherent
power to place restrictions on the employment of undocumented immigrants is still valid
where the laws are not preempted.
38. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
39. Id. at 1376 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)).
40. See Manheim, supra note 6, at 968-74.
41. Id. at 970 (quoting Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875)).
42., Id. at 971.
43. See supra Part II.A.
44. See Manheim, supra note 6, at 974-75; see also LISA M. SEGHErrI ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 5 (2009), availableat http://www.au.af.mil/au/awdawcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf.

45. United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001).
46. United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984). No
other circuits have specifically adopted the Tenth Circuit's holding on this proposition or
the proposition set forth in Santana-Garcia.
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cooperate with the federal government to enforce immigration law."
As noted above, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, which amended
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287 (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)).48
This amendment allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into
agreements with states or the political subdivisions of states where state
officers could be trained to perform immigration enforcement duties.
These duties include "investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens
in the United States."o These agreements can be tailored to meet local
needs and do not require local law enforcement officers to stop their
current duties." The local officers must have adequate knowledge of
federal law and must also receive training regarding the appropriate
enforcement of immigration laws. 52
The IIRIRA also amended § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)," of the INA
to allow the attorney general to utilize state and local police in an
immigration emergency." The section defines an emergency as an
"actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast.""
After the attorney general declares an immigration emergency, state
police officers may make civil or criminal arrests pursuant to federal
immigration law.56 But state police officers can make these arrests
only when they are expressly authorized to do so by the attorney general
and when they have the consent of the head of the state or local law
enforcement agency."
Congress gave express authority for state officers to enforce immigration law when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." One important amendment passed with the
Act was § 439, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1252c,59 which allows state and
local police officers to arrest aliens who reentered the United States after

47.

See SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 10.

48. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
49. Id. Under the original language of the statute, it is the attorney general who enters
into the § 287(g) agreements with the states. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 12.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).
51. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 12.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006).
54. Id.; SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 12.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2006).
56. Id.
57.

Id.; SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 13.

58. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006).
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a previous deportation following a felony conviction in the United
States.6 0 The law was meant "to overcome a perceived federal limitation on the ability of state and local officers to arrest [a known and
dangerous] alien." Finally, the plain language of INA § 274, codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c),62 suggests that all law enforcement officers,
including state and local ones, have the authority to arrest those people
violating § 274.63 The statute establishes criminal penalties for the
smuggling, transporting, concealing, and harboring of illegal aliens, and
subsection (c), entitled the "Authority to Arrest," states that "all other
officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws" may make arrests
under the statute. Therefore, while states historically have not been
allowed to enact systematic immigration regulations, Congress has
carved out a specific role for state level enforcement of immigration laws
in some limited contexts.
Recent State Acts Related to Immigration
The recent laws passed by the states are a new era of immigrationrelated laws testing what authority states have in enforcing federal
immigration law. Unauthorized immigration is a serious concern in
Arizona, and it is not surprising that Arizona was the first state to enact
one of these new-era immigration-related laws.6 ' The stated purpose
for enacting Arizona S.B. 107066 was to "make attrition through
enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies
in Arizona."' Attrition through enforcement appears to mean that the
state wanted to reduce the number of people coming into and staying in
Arizona illegally by enforcing both established federal immigration law
and the new laws enacted by the Arizona legislature. To achieve
attrition through enforcement, the law creates immigration-related
offenses and defines how Arizona state and local police officers can
enforce federal immigration law." However, before Arizona's act came
into effect, the United States Department of Justice sued Arizona in an
C.

60. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
61.

SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 44, at 13.

62. 8 U.S.C. 1324(c) (2006).
63.

SEGHETPI ET AL., supra note 44, at 14.

64. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c).
65. See Brady McCombs, Nearly 1,700 Bodies, Each One a Mystery, ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, Aug., 22, 2010, httpJ/azstarnet.com/news/local/border/article-d8972316-b63a-5e4
aad01-8518b0012730.html.
66. Ariz. S.B. 1070, Reg. Sess. (2010).
67. Id. § 1.
68. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 845 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (No. 11-182).
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attempt to enjoin the Act." The Department of Justice argued that
many provisions of the Act were preempted by the INA."o The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the Department
of Justice's motion for preliminary injunction in part by holding that four
sections of the law were likely preempted by federal law.n The United
States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to enjoin each of these sections." Currently, the Supreme
Court has granted the State of Arizona's petition for certiorari and will
hear the case in 2012." The four enjoined sections of the law (1) allow
Arizona state law enforcement officers to check the immigration status
of a lawfully stopped suspect when the officer has reasonable suspicion
the suspect is an illegal alien; (2) make it a state crime to violate a
federal law requiring aliens to complete and carry their registration
documents; (3) make it unlawful for an illegal alien merely to seek work;
and (4) allow an Arizona law enforcement officer to arrest a person when
the officer believes that person has committed a crime punishable by

deportation.

4

Like Arizona before it, the Georgia legislature enacted its own
immigration-related law in 2011, H.B. 87, which was "designed to
address the very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of
Georgia."7O The plaintiffs in GeorgiaLatino Alliance for Human Rights
v. Deal77 were nonprofits, businesses, and individuals who claimed that
two sections of the law were preempted by federal law.7 ' The Northern
District of Georgia agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement
of both sections.79 The sections would (1) allow Georgia state police
officers to check the immigration status of a person suspected of a crime
and (2) make it a state crime to transport, conceal, or harbor an illegal
alien in Georgia."o

69. Id. at 344.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (No. 11-182).
74. Ariz. S.B. 1070, § 2(B), 3, 5(c), 6 (codified in ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1509, 13-2928,
13-3883 (2012), available at http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp).
75. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (2011).
76. Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322
(N.D. Ga. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
77. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
78. Id. at 1322-23.
79. Id. at 1340.
80. Ga. H.R. Bill 87 §§ 8, 7 (codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 16, 17).
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In June 2011, the Alabama legislature enacted H.B. 56,s1 aimed at
discouraging illegal immigration.82 The United States moved to enjoin
ten sections of the Alabama law, and the United States District Court
for the District of Alabama agreed to enjoin four sections." Also, in
response to a lawsuit filed by a group of private plaintiffs, the district
court agreed to enjoin five more sections of the law.' Subsequently,
the Department of Justice and several private plaintiffs filed motions for
injunctions before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit." The Eleventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motions and
completely enjoined § 10 (where the district court only enjoined a subsection) and § 28." The ten enjoined sections and subsections (1) make
it illegal for anyone unlawfully present in the United States to attend a
postsecondary (college or university level) educational institution in this
state;87 (2) make it a state crime to violate federal registration document laws by not carrying proper identification;' (3) make it a crime
for an illegal alien to both look for and have a job (similar to Georgia's
law);89 (4) limit the type of immigration evidence an alien can use in
court when they are accused of either looking for or having a job;o (5)
make it a crime to impede traffic while trying to pick up a day laborer;9 ' (6) make it a crime to get into to a car stopped on a public
roadway in order to be hired by an occupant of that car;92 (7) make it
a crime to conceal, harbor, shield, or transport an illegal alien, or even
to encourage an illegal alien to come into the State of Alabama (again
similar to Georgia's law);" (8) penalize any employer who attempts to

81. Ala. H.R. Bill 56, Reg. Sess. (2011).
82. Id. § 2.
83. See Alabama, 813 F. Supp. at 1292-93.
84. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11 CV 2484 SLB, 2011 WL
5516953, at *53-54 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
85. United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x 411, 414 (11th Cir. 2011).
86. Id. at 19-20.
87. Ala. H.R. Bill 56 § 8 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-8 (2012), available at
http://www.alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
88. Id. § 10 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-10 (2012), availableat http//www.alisondb.
legislature.state.al.usacas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
89. Id. § 11(a) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a) (2012), availableat http//www.ali
sondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
90. Id. § 11(E) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(e) (2012), availableat http//www.ali
sondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
91. Id. § 11(f) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(f) (2012), available at http://www.ali
sondb.legislature.state.al.u/acas/ACASLoginIE.asp).
92. Id. § 11(g) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(g) (2012), availableat http/www.ali
sondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginIE.asp).
93. Id. § 13 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-13 (2012), availableat http //www.alisondb.
legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
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claim money paid to an unauthorized alien as a deductible business
expense for any state or business purpose in Alabama; 4 (9) give
employees and applicants the ability to sue their employers when they
are fired or simply not hired while the employer knowingly employs an
illegal alien;95 and (10) require that elementary schools and secondary
schools verify the immigration status of entering students."
III.

HAVE THE STATES GONE Too FAR?

This year the Supreme Court will address United States v. Arizona,"
and the Court's decision will most likely affect the constitutionality of
Georgia's and Alabama's laws as well. 8 In order to determine the
constitutionality of Arizona's immigration-related laws, the Court will
determine whether these laws are preempted by federal law." This
analysis will help the states understand the scope of their authority to
enact immigration-related laws. The Court's preemption analysis will
likely involve multiple legal doctrines and policies affecting the
immigration field. For one, the states' immigration-related laws raise
questions of just how far their police powers extend.'o Also, these
laws have a significant impact on foreign policy, which could be a
determining factor in whether or not the laws are constitutional.' 0 '
Ultimately, it seems the states will have a difficult road in arguing that
their laws are not preempted by federal law because of the multiple
ways that a law can be preempted. Furthermore, it appears that the
Court would have to extend both police power and foreign policy
jurisprudence past established precedent in order to uphold the states'
immigration-related laws.

94. Id. § 16 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-16 (2012), availableat http://www.alison
db.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
95. Id. § 17 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-17 (2012), available at http://www.alison
db.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp).
96. Id. § 28 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-28 (2012), availableat http://www.alison
db.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginIE.asp).
97. 641 F.3d 339(9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,132 S. Ct. 845 (U.S. Dec. 12,2011) (No.
11-182).
98. In fact, the attorneys general of eleven states, including Georgia and Alabama,
submitted an amici curiae brief to the Supreme Court in support of Arizona's law,
signifying the impact of the Court's future decision on their own laws. Brief for Arizona
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845
(2011) (No. 11-182), 2011 WL 4073071.
99. See infra Part lIM.A.
100. See infra Part II.A.1.
101. See infra Part MI.B.
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A. Preemption
Current challenges to state immigration legislation focus on whether
the state laws are preempted by federal law.'o2 In general, the
preemption arguments are based on the idea that the new state laws
cannot coexist with the federal immigration laws already in place.103
For example, some argue that the new laws will overly burden the
federal immigration system, that the state regulations create obstacles
to already existing federal immigration programs, and that Congress
chose to regulate certain aspects of immigration law so completely that
there is no room for state action.o' The battles about the states'
immigration-related laws will be won and lost in the arena of preemption and, therefore, a general understanding of the preemption doctrine
is necessary to understand both why the different courts' ruled like they
did and why the states have very limited power to pass immigrationrelated laws.
The Supremacy Clauselo' of the United States Constitution states
that the laws of the United States shall be the "supreme Law of the
Land."' This has led courts to recognize that when federal and a state
law conflict with one another, the federal law trumps the state law.
There are three recognized types of preemption: express preemption,
(implied) field preemption, and conflict preemption. 0 7
Express
preemption arises when Congress explicitly removes specified powers
from the states.'
Field preemption occurs when Congress legislates

102. See, e.g., Arizona, 641 F.3d 339; United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.
Ariz. 2010); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D.
Ga. 2011). The United States also argued that Arizona S.B. 1070 violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause, but the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found
no violation on those grounds. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Also, Georgia H.B. 87
was challenged on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds, but the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia was not persuaded by those arguments
and dismissed them in short order. GeorgiaLatinoAlliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39.
103. See, e.g., Arizona, 641 F.3d at 345; Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Ga. Latino
Alliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-30.
104. See, e.g., Arizona, 641 F.3d at 345; Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Ga. Latino
Alliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-30.
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
106. Id. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
107. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
108. Id.
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in a field of law so pervasively-or creates a comprehensive scheme of
legislation-that it implies that Congress did not want the states
legislating in the same area."o' Conflict preemption exists when the
federal and state laws cannot coexist or be enforced at the same
time.110 Conflict preemption has two types: 1) Impossibility conflict
preemption, where it is impossible to comply with both laws at once, and
2) obstacle conflict preemption, where the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently
objectives of Congress."'
stated that there are two guiding cornerstones courts should follow when
they analyze whether a law is preempted: first, "the purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone"; and second, there is a presumption against
preemption when "Congress has legislated. . . in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied."112 Briefly examining the lower courts'
decisions interpreting the states' immigration-related laws reveals that
courts are using these different types of preemption analyses to enjoin
the state laws."'
1. Express and Conflict Preemption Analysis. The lower courts
have found instances of express preemption. In United States v.
Alabama,"4 the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
found that two sections of Alabama's H.B. 56" were expressly preempted by federal law." 6 The court found that § 16, which penalizes
any employer attempting to deduct the payment of an unauthorized
alien as a business expense in Alabama, is a state sanction that is
prohibited under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)."x7 Because the court found
that § 16 created a sanction, the section was expressly preempted by
federal law."s The court also struck down § 17, which purports to give
fired employees and unsuccessful applicants the right to sue the

109. Id. at 227.
110. Id. at 228.
111. Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
113. It should be noted that these different types of preemption categories are terms
that are not always expressly used by courts. The Author is using these categories to
organize the lower courts' analysis.
114. 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
115. Ala. H.R. Bill 56, Reg. Sess. (2011).
116. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1339, 1342.
117. See id. at 1337-38; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). ("[Clivil or criminal sanctions
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a free employment, unauthorized aliens.").
118. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39.
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employer if it is knowingly employing an illegal alien."'9 Again, the
court found that the cause of action constituted an expressly preempted
sanction based on the employment of an authorized alien. 20
Additionally, the lower courts are relying on conflict preemption
analysis. As noted above, there are two categories of conflict preemption.' 2 ' The first category exists when it is impossible for two laws to
operate at the same time, and the second category exists when a state
law stands as an obstacle to federal law.'
The Northern District of
Georgia relied on obstacle-conflict preemption analysis to decide whether
certain sections of H.B. 87123 were preempted."
Georgia's law, H.B.
87 § 8, provides that "when [an] officer has probable cause to believe
that a suspect has committed a criminal violation, the officer shall be
authorized to seek to verify such suspect's immigration status when the
suspect is unable to provide one of [five specified identity documents]." 2 5 The district court began its preemption analysis by
observing that because enforcement of civil immigration offenses is not
a field traditionally occupied by states, there is no presumption against
preemption. 126 Here, the court found that when the states attempt to
enforce immigration, it undermines the immigration enforcement
priorities and strategies set by the executive branch.'2 7 The court was
also concerned that giving state officers both the discretion about when
to conduct the investigation of an illegal alien as well as "reasonable

119. See id. at 1339-42. The court summarized the language of § 17 as follows:
Section 17(b) creates a cause of action in favor of a United States citizen or a
lawfully-present alien against a business entity or employer. This cause of action
arises when a business entity/employer fails to hire or terminates the citizen or
authorized alien at a time when it has an employee that it knows or should know
is unlawfully present according to federal law, irrespective of considerations such
as cause for the termination or qualification for the position. Damages for a
violation of Section 17(a) are limited to compensatory damages and costs,
including attorneys' fees.
Id. at 1339-40 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1342.
121. See Nelson, supra note 107, at 228.
122. Id.
123. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (2011).
124. See Ga. Latino Alliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-33.
125. Ga. H.R. Bill 87 § 8 (codified in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b) (Supp. 2011)). Those
documents include: (1) a "secure and verifiable document as defined in Code Section 50-362"; (2) a "valid Georgia driver's license"; (3) a "valid Georgia identification card issued by
the Department of Driver Services"; (4) a valid license from another state or a valid
identification document issued by the federal government; and (5) a "document used in
compliance with paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-5-21." Id.
126. See Ga. Latino Alliance, 793 F. Supp. at 1330.
127. Id. at 1331-32.
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means" in conducting that investigation would create a risk of inconsistent civil immigration policies.128 How the immigration status of
criminal suspects is verified would not only vary state to state but also
from county to county in Georgia." Such a system would detract from
the uniform system established by Congress.2 0 Ultimately, the court
found that § 8 stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
objectives of Congress in the field of enforcing civil immigration offenses
and is therefore preempted."'
2. Field-Preemption Analysis. The lower courts have also used
field-preemption analysis to enjoin states' immigration-related laws. In

United States v. Arizona, 3 2 the Ninth Circuit held that § 3 of Arizona
S.B. 1070,1as which makes it a state crime to violate the federal
registration law, was preempted because Congress fully intended to
occupy the field of immigrant registration and left no room for the states
to complement the rules with auxiliary regulations."' The Ninth
Circuit observed that nothing in the text of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)13 1 shows that Congress intended the states to
participate in the punishment of violations of federal immigration
registration rules, and therefore, preemption is favored.'

128. Id. at 1332.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1333. In analyzing a very similar section in Alabama's law, the Northern
District of Alabama rejected this reasoning and found that Congress intended for state
officials to assist in checking the immigration status of aliens, and that the plain language
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) shows that local officials do have some
inherent authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law so long as the
state official cooperates with the federal government. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 132728. The court found that Alabama's law reflects intent to cooperate with the federal
government because all determinations of immigration status must be finalized by the
federal government. Id.
132. 641 F.3d 339(9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (U.S. Dec. 12,2011) (No.
11-182).
133. Ariz. S.B. 1070, Reg. Sess. (2010).
134. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355-56. Under Immigration Registration laws, when an alien
enters the U.S. he is required to fill out documents declaring:
(1) the date and place of entry of the alien into the United States; (2) activities in
which he has been and intends to be engaged; (3) the length of time he expects to
remain in the United States; (4) the police and criminal record, if any, of such
alien; and (5) such additional matters as may be prescribed.
8 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2006). The federal statutes also include penalties if an alien fails to
carry his registration documents. See id. § 1304(e) (2006).
135. 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1537 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
136. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 356.
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Intertwined with the different courts' field-preemption analysis is a
discussion about the states' inherent police powers. While state law
must yield to federal law when these laws interfere with one another,
individual state governments still retain great authority to pass laws to
protect "the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."'
This authority is known as a state's inherent police power.'38 Furthermore, a state has the ability to make arrests and govern employment
relationships in its own state pursuant to its police powers.' 3 9 When
the Supreme Court decides whether different states' laws are fieldpreempted, the Court may also need to analyze if the states even have
the authority to enforce their proposed laws.
One unresolved police power question is whether state police officers
have the authority to enforce federal immigration law. Section 6 of
Arizona S.B. 1070 provides that "[a] peace officer, without a warrant,
may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe [. . .1
[tihe person to be arrested has committed any public offense that makes
the person removable from the United States."o The Ninth Circuit
determined that § 6 allows a person to be arrested without a warrant
when "there is probable cause to believe the person committed a crime
in another state that would be considered a crime" in Arizona and such
crime would make the person removable from the United States. 4 1
Turning to whether § 6 was consistent with Congressional intent, the
Ninth Circuit examined 8 U.S.C. § 1252cl 42 (a section of the INA
defining the extent to which state and local law enforcement officers may
arrest illegal aliens) and concluded that nothing in the statute's
language permitted warrantless arrests.'4 Instead, the court observed
that warrantless arrests are allowed by Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) agents only when there is a fear that the detained
immigrant might escape before the agent can obtain a warrant.'" The

137. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475).
138. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
139. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("The promotion of safety of persons
and property in unquestionably at the core of the State's police power, and virtually all
state and local governments employ a uniform police force to aid in the accomplishment
of that purpose."); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 359 (1976), supersededby statute,
Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
140. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 6 (codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-3883 (2012), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp).
141. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 361 (quoting Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (emphasis
omitted)).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006).
143. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 361.
144. Id. at 361-62.
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court found both that Arizona cannot transform state and local law
enforcement officers into "a state-controlled DHS force," and that states
lack the inherent authority to enforce civil provisions of federal
immigration law. 45
The court concluded that the federal government has the sole
authority to decide which illegal aliens are arrested on the basis of their
immigration status and that § 6 interferes with the federal government's
enforcement of civil immigration offenses.'4 6 The court held that § 6
is preempted because Congress established a comprehensive federal
scheme for making arrests with which Arizona's law interferes.'
In
other words, there is no room for Arizona's law in this particular subfield
of immigration law. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it was rejecting the Tenth Circuit's holding in United States
v. Vasquez-Alvarez's that states do have the inherent authority to
make arrests for civil violations of federal immigration law.'
It is important to note that there are differences in civil violations of
federal immigration law and criminal violations of federal immigration
law.5 o For example, civil violations include illegal presence in the
country, whereas criminal violations include entering the country
illegally or harboring illegal aliens.'
Violators of the criminal
provisions can be prosecuted in federal court.1 2 In S.B. 1070, § 6
deals with a civil violation of federal immigration law: illegal presence
in the country.'
In Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth Circuit held that 8
U.S.C. § 1252c does not destroy states' inherent authority to enforce
federal immigration law for both criminal and civil violations but instead
"merely creates an additional vehicle for the enforcement of these federal
immigration law[s]." 54 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that
Congress specifically enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252c in order to give state
officers the authority to aid in enforcing federal immigration law.155
The court reasoned that Congress would not pass a law granting states
the authority to make arrests for violations of federal immigration law

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 362.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 365-66.
176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
Arizona, 641 F.3d at 363 (quoting Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295).

150.

SEGHE'PI ET AL., supra note 44, at 4.

151. Id.
152.

Id.

153. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 362.
154.

176 F.3d at 1295.

155. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 364.

1094

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

if Congress believed that the states already possessed that exact authority156
ty.xs
United States v. Arizona is not the first time the Ninth Circuit has
analyzed whether a state police officer can enforce federal immigration
law. In fact, the Ninth Circuit previously held that state police officers
do not have the authority to make arrests for civil violations of federal
law. In Gonzales v. City of Peoria,' the Ninth Circuit held that state
officers have the ability to enforce federal immigration law for criminal
violations but not civil ones, and until recently, that was the Department
of Justice's policy as well."58 But in 2002, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) released an opinion stating that state police officers can arrest
illegal aliens solely on the basis of deportability, a civil violation of
immigration law.'59 In that opinion, the DOJ concluded that state
police officers do have the authority to arrest an illegal alien violating
a civil violation of federal law, that is, illegal presence in the country.x'o The DOJ argued that it is unreasonable to assume that Congress would intend to deprive the federal government of whatever
assistance the states can provide in identifying and detaining people who
violate federal law.' 6' Therefore, federal statutes should not be
presumed to preempt the states' inherent authority to make arrests for
violations of federal immigration law.'6 2 At the conclusion of the
opinion, the DOJ forecasted that someone, or some court, might argue
that Congress would not pass 8 U.S.C. § 1252c if it felt the states
already had the authority to enforce federal immigration law (similar to
The DOJ even forecasted
the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit).'
that someone might object that their reading of the 8 U.S.C. § 1252c
would render it meaningless.'6" But the DOJ noted that if a court
finds that states do not have the authority to enforce civil provisions of
federal immigration law then 8 U.S.C. § 1252c "would operate to ensure
156. Id.
157. 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de
la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 476; Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens,
Op. O.L.C. (1996), availableat http://www.justice.gov/oldimmstopola.htm.
159. Re: Non-preemption of the authority of state and local law enforcement officials
to arrest aliens for immigration violations, Op. O.L.C. 7 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 DOJ
Opinion], available at http://www.axlu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf; see generally DAVID
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 56

(6th ed.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

2011).
2002 DOJ Opinion, supra note 159, at 13.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 11.
Id.
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that state police at least retained the authority to make such arrests of
aliens who had previously been convicted of a felony and had been
deported or had left the United States after such conviction."16" In
short, the DOJ articulated that state officers do have the inherent
authority to arrest non-citizens for civil violations of federal law, and
that 8 U.S.C. § 1252c does not preempt that authority. It is unclear how
the Supreme Court will rule on the issue of whether a state officer can
arrest an immigrant for illegal presence in the country or whether that
decision should be left in the hands of federal immigration enforcement
agencies. But, as displayed by the split in judicial and advisory
opinions, this is an issue that could affect both the Supreme Court's
field-preemption analysis and how states legislate in the field of
immigration law for years to come.
Another open question about the states' police powers is what
authority they have to regulate the employment relationship between
employers and immigrant employees. Section 5(c) of Arizona S.B. 1070
provides that "It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in
the United States and who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply
for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee
or independent contractor in this state."6 s As written, the section
criminalizes unauthorized work.16 ' In regard to this section, the Ninth
Circuit started its analysis in Arizona by noting that, through the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),'6e Congress has legislated in the area of undocumented workers' immigrant employment and
has attempted to deter illegal immigration by making jobs less
available-not by punishing those who attempt to find work."
Further, the court reasoned that the text of the IRCA shows there are many
examples of Congress being willing to punish the employer for hiring an
undocumented worker but nothing about punishing the undocumented
worker themselves.'
The court also found it persuasive that the
IRCA provided protections to undocumented workers, showing that
Congress had no intention to criminalize work.' 71 Here, it was Congress's inaction of not criminalizing work and not punishing the workers

165. Id.
166. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 5(c) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2928(C) (2012), available
at http//www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp).
167. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 357.
168. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
169. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 357 (quoting Nat'1 Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S.,
913 F.2d 1350, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183 (1991)).
170. Id. at 358.
171. Id.
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under the IRCA that convinced the court that any state attempt to do
otherwise cannot be allowed.172
Similar to Arizona's law, § 11(a) of Alabama's H.B. 56 makes it a
crime for an unauthorized worker to both look for a job and work in the
State of Alabama.1a Before it came into effect, Alabama's Act was also
enjoined on the grounds that many of its provisions were preempted.174
Similar to the analysis by the Ninth Circuit, the Northern District of
Alabama found that the text of the IRCA is clear, that Congress
attempted to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens by using civil
and criminal sanctions against employers, not employees.17 Ultimately, the district court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in Arizona, finding
that § 11(a) was preempted because Congress intended to punish
employers and not employees.176
Certainly, state governments have the authority to govern employment
relationships in their state.'7 7 But what both the states and courts
should keep in mind is that there are specific policy reasons for
punishing an employer of undocumented workers rather than punishing
the worker directly. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,17 s
the Supreme Court held that while undocumented workers are
considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),171 they cannot receive backpay as a remedy for an NLRA violation
because such a remedy would conflict with the purposes of the
IRCA.8 o The case is not necessarily important for its holding but
instead for the Court's rationale in deciding that undocumented workers
are not entitled to backpay or reinstatement under the NLRA.' 5 ' In
reaching this decision, the Court elevated the policy of reducing illegal

172. Id. at 359.
173. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
174. Id. at 1292.
175. Id. at 1312.
176. Id. at 1315.
177. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
178. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
180. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140, 144, 151.
181. In fact, in The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights
Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, Catherine Fish and Michael Wishnie
wrote that the case "did not break new doctrinal or theoretical ground"; instead, the article
suggests that the importance of the case comes from the fact that the majority found that
immigration policies trump labor policies. Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The
Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for
Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAw STORIES 351, 389 (Cooper & Fisk eds., 2005),
availableat httpJ/scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty-scholarship/1243.
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immigration over the policy of protecting workers' rights to unionize. 8 2
The majority concluded that allowing the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to award backpay or to reinstatement to illegal aliens
when they break the law to get their job would "condone[] and encourBut the dissent, written by
age[ future violations" of the IRCA."
Justice Breyer, argued that immigration and labor laws can work
together and urged the Court to defer to the NLRB, which decided
backpay and reinstatement were appropriate remedies for an undocumented worker even when he used false documents to obtain his job.xas
For one, Justice Breyer noted that the purpose of the employment
provisions in the IRCA was to "diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a 'magnet' pulls illegal immigrants toward the United
States," and that allowing NLRB to give backpay to undocumented
workers would not increase that magnetic force, or encourage more
people to enter the country illegally.'a Justice Breyer reiterated that
undocumented workers come into the country with the hope of finding
a job not with the hope of being protected by our laws.'s In fact,
Justice Breyer argued that not allowing undocumented workers to
receive backpay or reinstatement could actually increase illegal
immigrants in the workforce because companies would now have an
incentive to hire undocumented workers because there would be a lower
cost for an initial labor law violation.'
In fact, the reasoning utilized
in Justice Breyer's dissent-that punishing employers instead of
undocumented workers will decrease illegal immigration-has been
followed in many subsequent immigration employment law decisions.'
Even though state governments have the ability to regulate employment relationships in their state, they should remember that punishing
the employer, instead of the undocumented worker, was a specific
decision made by Congress, a decision that is backed by the policy of
reducing illegal immigration. If immigration laws did not punish
employers, then these employers would have an incentive to find
undocumented workers who could not enforce legal rights for any
violations committed by the employer. Of course, the Supreme Court

182. See id. at 389.
183. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150.
184. See id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 155.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 155-56.
188. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Rest. Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007); Rosa
v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 S.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 148
Cal. App. 4th 604, 617 (2007).
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might determine that there is enough room to allow states to punish
employees in conjunction with the employer.
This brief examination of states' immigration-related laws shows that
the Court has multiple ways to analyze, and strike down, these laws
under the preemption doctrine. This examination also demonstrates
that it is very difficult for states to legislate in the immigration field
because there are many ways that a state law can conflict with a federal
one. Furthermore, the federal government has legislated pervasively in
the immigration field pursuant to its plenary power. Additionally, the
Supreme Court might be unwilling to extend state police powers so far
as to allow states both to enforce federal immigration law and to
regulate immigrant employment relationships that Congress chose to
regulate through federal law. In light of these obstacles, a state
government will not be able to pass a true immigration reform legislative scheme; instead, that type of reform will have to come from
Congress.

B.

ForeignPolicy Implications

Immigration regulation and enforcement is completely intertwined
with foreign policy.'"' When a state, or a local government, takes
action to regulate immigration, the effect is felt on a national level."9 o
On the whole, foreign policy decisions are made at the federal level;
these decisions include going to war, ratifying treaties between nations,
taxing foreign imports, and authorizing sanctions against another
country.'9 1 Foreign policy is also determined by the executive branch
when the President creates executive agreements with foreign nations,
appoints ambassadors to other foreign nations, and exchanges information with foreign nations as well.9 2 This is not to suggest that states
have no role in foreign policy; instead, states and local governments
interact with foreign countries on a regular basis in ways that could
For example, American cities enter into
influence foreign policy.'
sister city agreements with foreign cities.194 Philadelphia has even
passed a proclamation affirming a United Nations Act to ensure equality
189. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 367 (Noonan, J., concurring) ("That immigration policy
is a subset of foreign policy follows from its subject: the admission, regulation and control
of foreigners within the United States.").
190. See id. at 368.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 616 (2008).
194. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration:American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,and
Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1641 (2006).
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for women when the United States government would not ratify the
Act. 5 But immigration is a delicate issue, and the Supreme Court
recognized that immigration implicates both foreign policy and national
security. 96 Because immigration is such a delicate issue, state involvement must be done carefully.
The debate surrounding the states' immigration-related laws and
foreign policy often focuses on whether the country should "speak with
one voice" on immigration-related matters.'
Proponents of the
singular voice argue that the United States cannot have fifty different
states with fifty different immigration policies."' Instead, national
foreign policy, which includes immigration regulation, must be uniform
and be governed at the federal level."' However, critics of this
viewpoint argue that public discourse on immigration must involve
"multiple voices."200 Additionally, the fact that national immigration
reform happens only every ten years or so suggests that the nation
cannot sustain a conversation on immigration for very long.20 ' Instead, these critics argue that immigration has a direct influence on local
communities, and immigration should include input from these local
voices as well.20 2 This Comment cannot definitely state which approach is correct, but there is a danger when state and local governments ignore the foreign policy implications of their decisions while
listening to the concerns of their citizens.
There is little doubt that the states' immigration-related laws were
passed in part because people believe that the federal government is not
doing its job to enforce federal immigration law.20 3 It is unknown
whether the Arizona legislators who passed S.B. 1070 had foreign policy
in mind; but it is apparent that the law received a negative response
from the international community.0" The leaders of Mexico, Bolivia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the governments of Brazil,

195. Id.
196. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889).
197. See U.S. Reps Visit Alabama to Talk About Immigration Law, SAND MOUNTAIN
REP. (Albertville, Ala.), Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.sandmountainreporter.com/news/state
news/article_02aea4d4-151f-1lel-937b-001cc4cO3286.html.
198. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 368 (Noonan, J., concurring).
199. See id.
200. Rodriguez, supra note 193.
201. Id. at 616-17.
202. See id. at 617.
203. See Georgia LatinoAlliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; see also Alia Beard Rau &
Mary Jo Pitzl, Momentum Built Up Over Years Led to New ImmigrationLaw, AZCENTRAL.
COM (May 9, 2010 12:00AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/09/20100509
immigration-law-momentum.html#ixzzlhNEM7JFZ.
204. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 353.
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Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; and the United Nations have all
publicly criticized Arizona's law.20 5 Even Deputy Secretary of State,
James B. Steinberg, publicly stated that S.B. 1070 threatens U.S. foreign
relations.2 06 Certainly, a state government should listen to the
concerns of its citizens, but when it comes to immigration, state
governments must be aware that their actions affect more than just
their state.
Besides a general warning to be cautious, conflicts with foreign policy
have led courts to find that states' immigration-related laws are
preempted because they offend or infringe on established foreign
policy.207 For example, when the Ninth Circuit ruled that part of
Arizona's law was preempted from authorizing state police officers to
check immigration status, it supported that preemption decision by
noting that the provision harms the United States' foreign relations.20 8
The Ninth Circuit cited the standard established by the Supreme Court
that preemption is required when "even ... the likelihood that state
legislation will produce something more than incidental effect" on the
nation's foreign policy.2 09 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the provision hinders the "[e]xecutive's ability to singularly manage
the spillover effects of the nation's immigration laws on foreign
affairs."2 10 This shows that if the states want to pass workable
immigration-related laws, they should seek to cooperate with the federal
government to try to form an immigration policy that both comports with
national foreign policy (that is, allows the nation to speak with one
voice) and addresses the concerns of citizens in local communities who
are affected by illegal immigration.
IV.

IF THE LAWS ARE PREEMPTED, WHAT ARE THE STATES LEFT
WITH?

Even if the Supreme Court holds that the enjoined sections of
Arizona's law are preempted and the Eleventh Circuit also determines
that the challenged provisions of Georgia's and Alabama's laws are
preempted, these states still have some ability to combat illegal
immigration. For example, many of the provisions of the states' laws

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
(2003)).
210.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 352; see also Georgia Latino Alliance, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 352.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,420
Id. at 354.
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were not enjoined."1 ' Also, until recently the states were able to enter
into agreements with the federal government to help enforce federal
immigration law. 2 12 But the federal government appears to be phasing
this program out thereby decreasing cooperation between the federal and
state governments.1 a As it stands right now the ability of states to
enforce immigration law is in flux. But no matter what role the states
ultimately play in enforcing federal immigration law, state legislators
should be mindful that passing immigration-related laws can lead to
unintended consequences.214
A. What Worked? Immigration-Related Laws That Were Not
Enjoined
Even though four provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070215 were enjoined,
many provisions were not. Arizona is enacting laws that encourage, and
in some instances require, state officials to enforce immigration laws.
For instance, the District of Arizona upheld a law which "prohibitled]
Arizona officials, agencies, and political subdivisions from limiting
enforcement of federal immigration laws." 216 Also, the court upheld a
section requiring "state officials [to] work with federal officials with
regard to unlawfully present aliens."217 The court also upheld a law
giving citizens of Arizona the right "to sue any state official, agency, or
political subdivision [if they adopt] a policy .. . restricting [the]
States who want to
enforcement of federal immigration law[].""2

increase enforcement of federal immigration law can legally mandate
state officials, agencies, and political subdivisions to enforce federal
immigration law to its full extent.
Arizona was able to pass new laws further regulating the employment
of undocumented workers. For example, the district court upheld
provisions of the Act that created stronger punishment for knowingly

211. See infra Part IVA.
212. See infra Part IV.B.
213. See infra Part IV.B.
214. See infra Part IV.C.
215. Ariz. S.B. 1070, Reg. Sess. (2010).
216. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010); Ariz. S.B. 1070
§ 2(A) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(A) (2012), available at http://www.azleg.gov
/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp).
217. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 2(C)-(F) (codified at Alz. REV.
STAT. § 11-1051(C)-(F) (2012), available at http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.
asp).
218. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 2(A), (G)-(L) (codified at ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 11-1051(A), (G)-(L) (2012), availableat http:/www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevised
Statues.asp).
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employing undocumented workers. 219 Also, the court upheld Arizona's
law that created stricter compliance standards for the E-Verify
employment verification process.22 0 Even though the United States
sought to enjoin S.B. 1070 as a whole, the court found that the Act was
severable (some sections of the Act created new statutes while other
portions amended existing statutes) and enjoined the portions of the bill
that were preempted by federal law.22' While the court did not
expressly state why certain provisions were upheld, it is most likely
because the states do have the inherent power to regulate business
licensing and employment regulations.
Similar to Arizona S.B. 1070, many provisions of Georgia H.B. 87222
were not challenged, again showing that states do have the inherent
authority to regulate business licensing, employment verification, and
criminal law even if these laws have provisions specifically dealing with
illegal immigrants. For example, the Georgia General Assembly
successfully enacted a law that requires stricter compliance by employers
with the federal work authorization program in order to verify the
employment eligibility of all new hires.22 3 Furthermore, the General
Assembly was able to enact another employment law that makes it a
crime to use fictitious information to obtain employment.224 The
General Assembly also enacted two laws that make it easier for state
actors to enforce federal immigration law. The first law attempts to
encourage more cooperation between state and federal officers by
immigration enforcement regulation and even goes so far as granting
immunity from damages to any law enforcement officer or government
official or employee who acts in good faith to enforce immigration laws
pursuant to an agreement with federal authorities. 225 The other law
creates financial incentives offsetting any financial burdens local law
enforcement agencies might face if they choose to partner with the

219. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 7 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 23-212 (2012), availableat http-//www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatues.asp). Section 7
states that when an employer violates this provision they must fire all their unauthorized
employees and the employer will be subject to a probationary period. Ariz. S.B.
§ 7(F)(1)(a)-(b) (codified at AIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-212(F)(1)(a)-(b)). Further, if the employer
has a second violation, they will have their business licence revoked. Id. § 7(F)(2) (codified
at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-212(F)(2)).
220. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. at 987; Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 9 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23214 (2012), availableat http-J/www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatuites.asp).
221. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. at 986.
222. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (2011).
223. See O.C.GA. § 13-10-91 (Supp. 2011).
224. See id. § 16-9-121.1 (2011).
225. Id. § 35-1-17 (Supp. 2011).
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Department of Homeland security to enforce federal immigration
laws. 226
The Georgia General Assembly also enacted a law that creates a new
governmental entity that exists to ensure that immigration laws are
This law establishes "IThe Immigration Enforcement
enforced."
Review Board," which will serve as the reviewing body for the regulations developed in H.B. 87.2@ The Board will have the power to
investigate any claims against employers not complying with either the
verification or registration requirements of the Bill.2 2 Further, the
Board has the power both to fine and sanction anyone who violates the
provisions of the Act.no A continuing trend is that states may pass
laws encouraging stricter compliance with the preexisting federal
immigration law. While states may not be able to pass wholesale
immigration reform, they should be encouraged to cooperate with federal
immigration enforcement agencies.
Alabama's H.B. 5 6 mi is arguably the toughest of any state immigration bill passed so far, and yet some of its most controversial provisions
were not challenged. For example, the Alabama legislature successfully
enacted a law that prevents any alien not lawfully present in the United
States from receiving any state or local public benefits. 2 It is likely
that this law was not challenged and successfully enacted because
Alabama controls local public benefits, and therefore Alabama should be
allowed to limit access to these services even when they affect undocumented immigrants. Ultimately, the fact that so many provisions of the
different states' acts were upheld or not challenged shows that the states
do have authority to pass immigration-related laws. But going forward,
states should only pass laws that give them authority to act under their

226. Id. § 35-6A-10 (Supp. 2011).
227. See id. § 50-36-3 (Supp. 2011).
228. Id.
229. Id. § 50-36-3(e).
230. Id. § 50-36-3(h).
231. Ala. H.B. 56, Reg. Sess. (2011).
232. Ala. H.B. 56 § 7(b) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-7(b) (2012), available at
http*//www.alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginlE.asp). State and local benefits
are defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) as
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided
by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State
or local government; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit,
or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.
8 U.S.C. § 1621 (c)1XA)-(B) (2006).
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historic police powers and merely encourage cooperation between state
and federal actors.
B. ICE's Enforcement of Immigration Law and the Chilling of
CooperationBetween the Federal Government and the States
U.S. Immigration Custom and Enforcement (ICE) is the "principal
investigative arm" for the Department of Homeland Security.233 ICE
has more than 20,000 employees in all fifty states and is primarily
responsible for enforcing federal immigration laws as well as laws
One of the reasons
governing border control, customs, and trade."3
the states' immigration-related laws were passed is because people felt
that ICE was not doing enough to keep illegal aliens from coming into
the country."
In response, the states decided to act. But as displayed by the courts' treatment of these laws, the states may have
legislated in an area where they did not have the room, or the legal
authority, to do so. In Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Deal,2 " before concluding his preemption discussion of Georgia's
immigration-related law, Judge Thrash made it a point to dispel the
myth that ICE is not doing anything about illegal immigration. 23 7 He
noted that, in 2010, immigration offenses were prosecuted in federal
courts more than any other offense, and that the federal government
makes it a priority to prosecute and remove illegal immigrants who have
previously been deported for serious criminal offenses.238 Judge
Thrash also observed that while local and national enforcement priorities
might differ, it is only because the federal government has the difficult
task of balancing the interests of protecting the public, securing the
borders, and protecting national security."
Further, recent analysis shows that ICE is deporting illegal aliens
from the United States at record numbers."o In fact, under the
Obama administration, ICE deported 396,906 people in the last fiscal

233. ICE Overview, ICE.Gov, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2012).
234. Id.
235. See Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1335
(N.D. Ga. 2011); see also Rau & Pitzl, supra note 203.
236. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
237. Id. at 1335.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1335-36 (quoting United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352 (2011)).
240. Jeremy Redmon, ICE Deported Record Number of Noncitizens in Fiscal '11,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 18, 2011, http-//www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/icedeported-record-number-1204728.html.
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year, which is the largest number of people ever deported in one
Of -that group, nearly fifty-five percent were convicted of
year."
Within the past year, ICE has made it a
felonies and misdemeanors."
priority to deport aliens who pose either a danger to national security or
In the face of an "increasing number of
a risk to public safety. "
criminal aliens who ... come to ICE's attention," the agency implemented the priority system out of a need to exercise discretion." Furthermore, ICE focused on creating a smart and effective way to enforce
immigration laws, and in a "world of limited resources," a priority
system allows them to get the most out of the resources they do
have." The increase in deportations (both of illegal aliens overall and
of dangerous aliens) shows that ICE's new system is producing results.
As part of ICE's enforcement duties, the agency claims to work closely
with state and local governments." In fact, ICE still encourages the
use of its ICE ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to
Enhance Safety and Security) program, which provides local communities different options to team up with ICE to "combat specific challenges
in their communities."247 One of those options is forming agreements
between ICE and local governments. Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g),24 8
these are commonly referred to as 287(g) agreements, named for their
section number in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)."
These agreements allow state police officers to become certified to
perform the duties of a federal immigration officer, including investigation, apprehension, and detention of illegal aliens.250 The goal of these
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Memorandum from John Morton, Dep't of Homeland Security to Immigration &
Customs Enforcement Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
news/releases/2011/110302wasbingtondc.pdf.
244. Id. at 4.
245. Redmon, supra note 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. Fact Sheet: Delegationof ImmigrationAuthority Section 287(g) Immigration and
NationalityAct,ICE.Gov, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter ICE Fact Sheet].
247. Id.

248. See 8 U.S.C § 1357(g) (2006).
249. 8 U.S.C.
at 14.

§§ 1101-1537 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); SEGHETHI

ET AL., supra note 44,

250. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(gXl).
Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, the Attorney General may enter into a
written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant
to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by
the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the
United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to
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agreements is to ensure that state and local police officers receive proper
Also, under these
training on how to enforce immigration law."
by the Attorney
to
direction
agreements, state officers are subject
252
state
officers will
the
This arrangement ensures that
General.
receive appropriate supervision in enforcing immigration law, but it also
means that the federal authorities "hold the reins" under 287(g) agreeRecently, however, the Department of Homeland Security
ments.
decided to drastically decrease funding for the 287(g) program.
While ICE will continue to fund some 287(g) programs that are already
established, it will not enter into any new agreements and will cease
funding for some of the "least productive" 287(g) agreements around the

nation.5

The Department of Homeland Security cited budget con-

cerns as the reason for cutting the program, believing that there are
other programs to enforce immigration law that are more cost effec-

tive. 256

Practically, these agreements were created by a state entering into a
memorandum of understanding with ICE; these memorandums set out
the scope of authority local governments have pursuant to their
agreement with ICE." These memorandums also set out the training
requirements local officers must complete to be able to enforce federal
In general, ICE required that these officers
immigration law."
complete a four-week course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Program at the ICE Academy." 9 The training included: teaching the
officers the scope of their authority under federal law; cross-cultural
issues; and the proper use of force. 260 The training also covered civil
rights law and liability issues, and it even covered the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 6 ' Even with these established safeguards

detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or
political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.
Id.
251. See id. § 1357(g)(2).
252. Id. § 1357(gX3).
253. Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution:A Study of Arizona Before SB
1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1780 (2011).
254. Alan Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to be Shut Down, USA TODAY,
Feb. 17,2012,http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-17/immigration-enforce
ment-program/53134284/1.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 246.
258. See SEGHE'ITI ET AL., supra note 44, at 15-18.
259. See ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 246.
260. SEGHE'ITI ET AL., supra note 44, at 15.

261. Id.
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in place, the 287(g) program was criticized in Homeland Security
inspector general reports, which stated that the local officers were not
being properly trained and there was not enough oversight in place to
prevent the possibility of racial profiling. 26 2
It is disappointing that ICE is phasing out the 287(g) program. For
one, even in the face of criticism, the program did produce some positive
results. For example, the 287(g) agreement program saw some success
in Harris County, Texas.26 3 The Harris County Sherriff's Office
started its 287(g) program on August 18, 2008, and after only one year,
the task force was able to place 10,102 detainers." When an illegal
alien is detained by local law enforcement, the law enforcement office
will then contact ICE, which then has forty-eight hours to assume
custody of that alien.26 5 One example of the 287(g) agreement's
successes is that through a sherriff's office's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) program, officers were able to identify
and apprehend a suspect who was wanted for two murders in Mexico. 266 This IDENT program allows officers in the sheriff's department
to search a federal database of wanted and dangerous illegal aliens.6
In 2009, the Harris County Sherriffs Office was adding six terminals
that would allow them to quickly identify foreign-born prisoners who
may need to be transferred into ICE's custody.268 This sharing of
information between federal and state law enforcement agencies may
have been one of the 287(g) agreement program's greatest successes
because it encouraged cooperation between federal and local authorities.
The Whitfield County Sherriff's Office in Georgia is another example
of how the 287(g) agreement program was successful in enforcing federal
immigration policy on a state and local level. The Whitfield County
Sherriff's Office started its 287(g) program in February 2008, and it is

262. Gomez, supra note 254. However, the Governmental Oversight Committee
audited a number of different 287(g) programs around the nation and found that at least
until 2009 there had been no substantiated claims of racial profiling during the
enforcement of the 287(g) programs. Interview with Jessica Vaughn, Director of Policy
Services, Center for Immigration Studies, Local Enforcement of FederalImmigrationLaw
and 287(g), LEAPS.Tv (July 28, 2009), slide 51, http*//www.cis.org/articles/2009/leaps/in
dex.htm.
263. Vaughn, supra note 262, at slide 25-29.
264. Id. at slide 26.
265. Enforcement, Detainers: Challenging the Use of ICE Immigration Detainers,
LEGALACTIONCENTER.oRG, http-I/www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghousellitigation-issuepages/enforcement-detainers (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
266. Vaughn, supra note 262, at slide 27.
267. See id.
268. Id. at slide 29.
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Through their
exclusively a jail enforcement officer program.26
program, the Whitfield County Sherriff's Office has detained multiple
dangerous illegal aliens, leading to their prosecution or deportation.2 70
Another benefit of the program is removing illegal aliens who were
repeat criminal offenders. 2 71 The removal of these aliens has substantially decreased the financial strain on the county caused by the housing,
medical, legal, and other costs of processing repeat offenders.272 For
example, one particular individual was arrested thirteen times since
coming to the county in 1997, and the sherriff's office estimated that the
individual cost the county around $20,000 in incarceration expenses
alone. 273 But because the sherriff's office was able to identify him as
an illegal alien, the officers were able to remove him from the county,
thus saving tax payers any further costs. 2 74
The Collier County Sherriffs Office in Florida is one more example of
a successful 287(g) program. The Collier County program consists of a
jail identification program similar to the one in Texas and Georgia, and
an Investigative Task Force program.2 " The program was started in
2007, and just one day after the program started, the Investigative Task
Force made its first arrest. 2 76 The Task Force was investigating a
person suspected of murdering his eight-month-old daughter, and who
also had a warrant out for his arrest for raping a child in California, but
for different reasons, the officers could not make the arrest on those two
grounds. 277 However, after bringing the man to the police station for
an interview, the officers ran an immigration check through their 287(g)
program, and they discovered he used false documents to enter the
country.17 1 The officers were able to make an immigration arrest, and
eventually the state was able charge him for the other crimes. 7 ' The
Collier County program has also had successful collaborative efforts with
ICE and was even commended by the Department of Homeland Security
for running an efficient program and refraining from tactics like racial
profiling. 280

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at slide 30.
See id. at slide 31.
See id. at slide 32.
Id.
Id. at slide 33-34.
Id. at slide 34.
Id. at slide 36.
Id. at slide 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Perhaps the biggest disappointment associated with the loss of the
287(g) program is that it signals a step backwards in collaboration
between federal and local authorities. As noted above, one of the
reasons the states passed their immigration-related laws is because they
felt the federal government was not doing enough to enforce federal
immigration law.2 1 ' Now it seems that the federal government is
ostracizing the states even more by refusing to enter into any more
287(g) agreements. When the states passed their immigration-related
laws, they attempted to give their local police officers the authority to
enforce federal immigration laws by creating state criminal penalties for
breaking federal immigration laws."8 Based on the different courts'
treatment of these provisions, it seems the states exceeded their police
powers by passing those types of laws. Before the 287(g) program's
budget was decreased, courts could at least point to a better alternative
where ICE and the states worked together to enforce federal immigration law. Now, if the states' laws are struck down, they will be left with
few alternatives other than deferring to the federal government. It is
possible that it will not be long before the states pass new versions of
their immigration-related laws and will continue to do so until national
immigration reform is passed."

C. Avoiding Unintended Consequences of New Legislation
The passing of the states' immigration-related laws certainly affects
how far state officers can go in enforcing immigration law, but unfortunately the laws have had unintended consequences outside of the
courtroom. For one, these laws have affected the economies of Arizona,
In response to Arizona's law, many people
Georgia, and Alabama.'
protested by boycotting Arizona-based businesses, and multiple groups
cancelled their plans to visit the state, leading to lost revenue for

281. See Rau & Pitzl, supra note 203.
282. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 344.
283. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF: No EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: THE UNCONsTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAW (2011), available at http//papers.asrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstractid=2002369.
284. See Erin Kelly, Arizona's Immigration Law Has Ripple Effect, ARIz. REPUBuC,
Apr. 28, 2010, httpJ/www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/04/28/20100428arizona-immigration-law-impact.html; see also Redmon, supra note 240; Jeanne Bonner,
Crop Losses Could Top $1B, GPB.ORG (June 23, 2011), http://www.gpb.org/news/2011/06/
23/crop-losses-could-top-lb; Alabama Forum Explores ImmigrationLaw Labor Shortage,
MSNBC.com (Dec. 6,2011), http:/Avww.menbc.man.com/id/45575504/ns/us-news/tlalabamaforum-explores-immigration-law-labor-shortage/ [hereinafter Alabama Labor Shortage].
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In Georgia, the state has
Arizona hotels and other local businesses.'
suffered a substantial loss to its agricultural workforce, which was likely
caused by the legislature passing Georgia H.B. 87.28 When the law
passed, there was a mass "exodus" of undocumented workers, leaving
Georgia farmers with a severely reduced workforce."' Because there
are not enough workers to harvest crops, Georgia fruit and vegetable
farmers could lose upwards of $300 million dollars in crop sales.28
Alabama is facing the same problem. In response to Alabama's H.B. 56,
many undocumented workers left the state, and others are too afraid to
The shortage has left local
try to find work with local farmers."
community leaders scrambling to find ways to fill the labor shortage in
time for the 2012 harvest. 29 0
Besides economic impact, the recent state laws can potentially create
a "culture of fear" for illegal aliens in these states. 29e Unfortunately
that is already the case in Alabama where there have been reports that
women will not go to the hospital to have their babies because they are
afraid of being deported." 2 Also, crime victims are afraid to call the
police, and parents are too scared to send their children to school. 293
Basically, people without immigration documents are no longer able to
participate in society.294 Furthermore, in Georgia Latino Alliance for
Human Rights v. Deal the court attached a declaration by Lewis Smith,
the Chief of Police for Uvalda, Georgia.295 In that declaration, Mr.
Smith stated that, while he had a good relationship with the Hispanic
community, he also believed that Georgia's law would erode that
relationship. 296 The states have to be very careful because when a
group of people are shut out of the official system, it creates an unofficial
system outside of society's rules. Even though the states' laws were
passed with the purpose of "attrition through enforcement," every illegal
alien is not going to leave. Furthermore, stricter enforcement of
285. See Kelly, supra note 284.
286. See Bonner, supra note 284.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Alabama Labor Shortage,supra note 284.
290. See id.
291. Sally Kohn,Arizona ImmigrationLaw: PainfidLessons from Oklahoma, CHRISTIAN
SCl. MONrroR, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0428/
Arizona-immigration-law-painful-lessons-from-Oklahoma.
292. Editorial, Alabama's Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/04/opinion/alabamas-shame.html.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. 793 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-43.
296. Id. at 1341-42.
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immigration laws could cause the people who stay to be distrustful of the
police and also cause them to withdraw from public places.297 In sharp
contrast, though, under the cooperative 287(g) program utilized by the
Whitfield County Sherriffs Office, there was a substantial outreach
effort to the community ensuring them that the sherriff's office was only
detaining potential illegal aliens who commit crimes and not victims of
crimes."' In fact, that program actually led to aliens coming to the
sherriffs office to ask questions about immigration law issues.299
V.

CONCLUSION

As it stands, there are too many obstacles for states to pass comprehensive immigration reform. The states also have to be careful when
they pass immigration-related laws. Besides the risk that these laws
will be preempted, they could also conflict with established precedent on
foreign policy and state police powers. These laws might also lead to
unforeseen consequences that will be harmful to both citizens and noncitizens. But states that want to combat illegal immigration are not
without options. The states can pass laws that regulate employment in
their state, and they can also pass laws that encourage cooperation
between state and federal officers. Unfortunately, the federal government seems to be phasing out the programs that facilitated this very
type of cooperation. It seems the 287(g) program had too many
challenges, making it difficult for the Department of Homeland Security
to operate both effectively and efficiently. But cooperation between the
federal government and the states should be encouraged when it comes
to enforcing immigration law. Instead of fifty different states trying to
pass immigration laws that will ultimately conflict with one another, the
federal government and the states should work together to find a
cooperative and uniform system of enforcement.
JONATHAN FUTRELL
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